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How the Tobacco Industry May Pay for
Public Health Care Expenditures Caused

by Smoking: A Look at the Next Wave of
Suits Against the Tobacco Industry
MARK D. FRIDY'

INTRODUCTION
Although studies show that 400,000 or more Americans die annually from
health problems caused by cigarette smoking,' tobacco companies have yet to
lose a single cent in final judgments awarded to plaintiffs in lawsuits asking for
health-related damages.2 This information is cited often and is shocking to many,

but may soon be obsolete. While tobacco companies have had remarkable success
defending their products against individual smokers in personal injury cases
during the past several decades, their seemingly impenetrable armor is beginning
to show signs of wear. For example, in 1996, for the first time ever, a cigarette

company has settled a health-related lawsuit.3 In addition, a private plaintiff
recently won an award of $750,000 in a Florida trial court.' This judgment is not
the first win for a plaintiff at the trial court level, but would be the first final

judgment if it is sustained on appeal.'
While these developments alone do not threaten the tobacco industry, the trend
that they illustrate does pose a threat. The legal and political climate in America

appears to be shifting, and, if that is the case, the tobacco companies may be

* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992,
University of Louisville. I would like to thank my wife, Shelly Gibson, for her valuable
suggestions and support while writing this Note. Special thanks also to Professor Aviva
Orenstein for her insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Charles Marwick, Tobacco ControlReport CardFailsSome FederalEntities, Gives
All Tough FutureAssignments, 271 JAMA 645, 645 (1994).
2. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History ofthe Tobacco Tort Litigation,44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 878 (1992). Until 1996, tobacco companies had not even paid any money in (reported)
settlements of health-related lawsuits linked to smoking.
3. In March 1996, Liggett Group reached a settlement with Mississippi, West Virginia,
Florida, Louisiana, and Massachusetts in those states' lawsuits to recover health care costs
caused by smoking. The settlement called for a cash payment of $5 million to be split among
the five states, a continuing payment to the states out of Liggett's profits, and an agreement to
eliminate advertising aimed at children. The settlement also left open the door for other states
to join at a later date; this would result in an adjustment in the amount each state would receive
from Liggett's profits. Anna W. Mathews, Liggett Settlement Could Be Broadened,THE NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh), July 24, 1996, at D1, availablein 1996 WL 2889399; Milo Geyelin,
Liggett, Five States Set Pact Covering Treatment ofSmoking-Related Illnesses, WALL ST. J.,
March 18, 1996, at A3.
4. This judgment is pending appeal. Nick Ravo, Smoker's SuitBringsAward of $ 750, 000
in Florida,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1996, at 8.
5. Id.
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forced to pay for the health problems and the financial consequences caused by
smoking.
In addition to measuring the costs of tobacco in subjective terms, 6 another way
to measure the costs of America's 7 tobacco problem is to look at the economic
costs, both direct and indirect, associated with smoking. Many commentators
argue that, while smoking is an activity that should be allowed in our free
society, tobacco companies and those who smoke should directly and completely
bear the costs of smoking, and the government should eliminate any subsidies
that are provided to tobacco by non-smokers. 8 From an economic perspective,
this recommendation makes perfect sense: if tobacco companies and smokers
bear the true, unsubsidized, cost of smoking, the increased expense will cause a
decrease in smoking. 9
One particular class of subsidies that the government provides to tobacco
companies and smokers is Medicaid, Medicare, and other public health programs.
While smokers and non-smokers pay equally into the system of subsidized health
care for the poor and elderly in this country, smokers disproportionately drain the
system of its resources. Recently proposed federal legislation included estimates
that, in 1994, illnesses and diseases attributable to tobacco use cost the
government $16 billion in Medicare expenditures, and $3 billion in Medicaid
expenditures, and stated that those programs will be insolvent in seven years. 0
This Note will focus on federal and state governments' responses, both in
legislatures and courts, to rising expenditures made necessary because of
smoking-related illnesses and diseases. Part I looks briefly at the Medicare and
Medicaid system and examines cost estimates of smoking on the programs that
fund public health. Part II examines the federal, and some selected state
governments', preliminary responses to this situation through new legislativelycreated causes of action as well as the more traditional common law causes of
action. Part III considers a number of factors involved in the potential success
or failure of the current strategies. They include politics, public policy issues,
and the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different litigation

6. While some people suffer from the long-term effects of smoking, others never
experience these effects. Additionally, many smokers derive at least short-term pleasure from
smoking. This Note does not attempt to address these subjective measures, but focuses on
quantifiable health care expenditures.
7. Although scholars, politicians, and the general public are increasingly debating the
international issues concerning smoking, this Note will focus only on America's problems with
and responses to cigarette smoking. Also, this Note will only consider the legal smoking of
tobacco products and will not deal with other controlled substances.
8. Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute
Liability to CigaretteManufacturers,52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 406 (1991).
9. This assumes that people are able to stop smoking. Although addiction may lessen some
smokers' willingness to substitute cheaper goods for tobacco, some smokers would no doubt
quit if tobacco prices rose dramatically.
10. S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). These estimates of cost only include
expenditures for inpatient hospital services. The bill estimates that these programs initially will
cost a total of $128 billion on such illnesses and diseases and that over the next 20 years,
illnesses and diseases attributable to smoking will cost the Medicare trust funds at least $800
billion.
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strategies. While it is impossible to predict the ultimate success of these
strategies in a field this open, this Note attempts to weigh their relative strengths
and weaknesses and determine which ones seem most likely to provide
reimbursement to the various levels of government involved.
I. MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND OTHER PUBLIC HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURES ATTRIBUTABLE TO SMOKING

The system of subsidized health care for the elderly and poor in the United
States is currently not in a sound financial position and is in danger of becoming
insolvent in the next decade." One response to this problem has been a push in
the last few years for health-care reform, including Medicare and Medicaid
reform. Another response, the focus of this Note, has been for government
officials at the state and federal level to attempt to make tobacco companies pay
for the expenses the system has incurred as a result of citizens' smoking.
In order to determine the total amount spent by our federal and state
governments on tobacco-related illnesses, and therefore the tobacco companies'
potential liability, it is necessary to have reliable figures of actual costs incurred.
A joint effort of the University of California and the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC") has produced the most persuasive study on this subject.'" This study
estimates that of the $308.7 billion spent on direct medical care" in 1987, $21.9
billion (or 7.1%) was attributable to smoking. When adjusted for 1993 figures,
the study estimates that a total of $50 billion was spent to treat smoking-related
14
illness and disease.
More pertinently, the study also reports on the amount of money spent by
Medicare, Medicaid, and other public sources that smoking necessitated. In 1987,

11. Id.
12. Current Trends: Medical-CareExpenditures Attributable to Cigarette SmokingUnited States, 1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 469 (1994) [hereinafter
Medical-Care Expenditures]. This study used data from the 1987 National Medical
Expenditures Survey and from the Health Care Financing Administration. The researchers used
figures from 1987 and then calculated a total expenditure figure for 1993 by adjusting the 1987
figure. The model categorized participants as a "smoker" or "former smoker" as a person
exposed to smoking for a minimum of 15 years, and controlled for confounding factors such
as "age, race/ethnicity, poverty status, marital status, education level, medical insurance status,
region of residence, safety-belt nonuse, and obesity." Id at 469-70. But cf Willard G. Manning
et al., The Taxes ofSin: Do Smokers and DrinkersPay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1604 (1989)
(This study argues society's medical care costs caused by smoking are not as high as thought
by some because, although smokers pay into the health care system, they often die prematurely
and therefore do not drain the system of resources in their old age. The study also offsets
revenue derived from excise taxes paid by tobacco companies, an issue which is discussed in
Part III of this Note.).
13. Direct medical-care expenditures include expenses from prescription drugs,
hospitalization, physician care, home health care, and nursing home care. Medical-Care
Expenditures,supra note 12, at 470.
14. Id. The report acknowledges that much of this increase from $21.9 billion in 1987 to
$50 billion in 1993 is the result of increased medical care prices across the board. Id.
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the amount spent on these programs totaled $9.512 billion. 5 This amount jumped
to $21.36 billion in 1993.6 Overall, the study estimates that in 1987 the
government picked up the tab for over forty percent of the medical care costs for
7
treatment of illnesses and diseases attributable to smoking.'
While these numbers are astoundingly large, the study describes them as an
underestimate of the real costs of medical care that are attributable to smoking
because of two factors which did not play a part in the statistical model." First,
the study underestimates costs because direct medical costs are limited to the
categories listed above 9 and do not include costs such as treatment for burns due
to smoking-related accidents, care for low-birthweight babies of mothers who
smoke, and disease from environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS")-also called
second-hand smoke.20 Second, the study underestimates real medical care costs
attributable to smoking because indirect costs of morbidity and early mortality, 2'
estimated at $6.9 billion and $40.3 billion respectively for 1990, are excluded
from the study. 2 Adding these figures to the direct costs of health care could
more than double the total figure calculated for medical care expenditures
attributable to smoking.3
In addition to the University of California/CDC study, other studies have
estimated the amount the federal government spends on health care as a result of
smoking. United States Senators Frank Lautenberg and Tom Harkin sponsored
a bill in Congress on June 28, 1994, which had the purpose of "provid[ing]
additional methods of recovering costs to the Federal Government health care
programs attributable to tobacco related illnesses and diseases., 24 The proposed

15. Medicare expenditures attributable to smoking were $4.485 billion, Medicaid
expenditures attributable to smoking were $2.244 billion, "other federal" spending amounted
to $2.091 billion, and "other state" spending equaled $692 million. Id. at 471.
16. Id. The article states that medical care expenditures attributable to smoking equaled
$2.06 per pack for the 24 billion packs of cigarettes smoked in 1993 (for a total of $49.4
billion). The article says that $0.89 of the $2.06 per pack was paid by public sources. When the
$0.89 per pack is multiplied by 24 billion (packs sold in 1993), this results in the $21.36 billion
figure paid by the various levels of government for medical care attributable to smoking. This
includes "other federal" and "other state" spending in addition to Medicare and Medicaid
spending.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 472.
19. The categories included in the study are prescription drugs, hospitalization, physician
care, home-health care, and nursing home care. Id. at 472.
20. While the economic costs of illness and disease from ETS are not available at this time,
there is a persuasive body of literature developing that suggests that the effects of ETS are more
serious than has been thought in the past. Studies estimate that approximately 53,000 people
die each year from exposure to ETS, and litigation involving victims of ETS is blossoming in
many areas of the country. Sheryl Stolberg, UnwillingFighterin War on Secondhand Smoke
Health, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at 1.
21. Medical-CareExpenditures,supra note 12, at 472. Examples of indirect costs are days
lost from work to smoking-attributable sickness and loss of productivity because of premature
death of smokers.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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bill estimated that the government spent at least $19 billion on tobaccoattributable illnesses and diseases in 1994-$16 billion in Medicare expenditures
and $3 billion in Medicaid expenditures.2"
Taken as a whole, these statistics show that tobacco-attributable medical
expenditures create an immense economic problem, but they still only show part
of the problem. These studies deal mainly with federal expenditures; they miss
the fact that the states also contribute significant funds to the Medicaid system,26
and spend money operating other purely state programs that incur similar
expenses. Estimates are not available from all or even most states, but, in the
process of the new wave of state litigation, Florida estimated expenses which that
state incurred because of tobacco-related illness.27 While the state lists expenses
incurred due to each of several categories of disease,28 the total reaches an
astounding $289 million per year.29 Since the lawsuit filed by Florida sought to
recoup smoking-related medical care expenditures over five years, the State
requested $1.4 billion in damages. 0 Since these figures are only requested
damages, some people may rightfully question the impartiality of these amounts.
As estimates, however, they show that the states spend a very large sum of
money on diseases and illnesses that are caused by smoking.
II. RECENT LEGISLATION

AND LITIGATION BY THE STATES

AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The problem of public expense associated with tobacco-related illnesses and
diseases is, of course, not a new one. The possibility that the government might
be able to sue to recover such expenses is also not new,31 but only recently have
officials at different levels of government taken action. At last count, eleven
states have filed lawsuits asking tobacco companies to reimburse their tobaccorelated health care expenditures and other states have announced intentions of
following in their footsteps.32 Additionally, federal legislation designed to

25. d:
26. See Theodore N. McDowell, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Amendments: Their Impact on the Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY L.J. 691, 697

(1987).
27. See Mike Thomas, Money to Burn, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 21, 1995, at 8, available

in LEXIS, News Library, ORSENT File (discussing the costs associated with smoking and the
lawsuit filed by the State of Florida to recoup medical expenditures caused by smoking).
28. These are: $197.5 million spent on the treatment of respiratory disease, $18.2 million
on lung cancer, $17.3 million on other types of cancer, $43 million on stroke, and $13.2
million on heart disease. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. An early ruling by the Florida courts, however, has limited the State by only

allowing recovery for money spent to treat smoking-related illness and disease after the statute
was passed. James Cahoy, FloridaSupreme Court Upholds Most of Tobacco Liability Law,

West's Legal News, July 3, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 365758.
31. Donald W. Gamer, Cigarettesand Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 314 (1977).

32. Cahoy, supranote 30; Mathews, supra note 3. These states are Connecticut, Florida,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, Washington,
and West Virginia. See also Tobacco: Massachusetts GovernorSigns LegislationAuthorizing

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:235

support a similar federal lawsuit was proposed in Congress in 1994" and could
be again if the climate for such action proved favorable. The states have taken
a variety of approaches to litigating this issue. The approaches run the gamut
from statute-based litigation in Florida34 to filing a suit in equity in Mississippi. 5
While the states and federal government have taken different paths in litigating
these actions, there are many similarities in the way they have attacked the
problem. This Part of the Note describes the decidedly different approaches
taken in Florida and Mississippi, two leading states in this battle. This Part also
briefly describes the ongoing litigation in some other selected states and
discusses the proposed relevant federal legislation.
A. Florida'sApproach

Florida presents one of the most interesting and novel case studies among the
various approaches to the current wave of tobacco litigation. In April, 1994, the
Florida Legislature passed amendments to the Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act36 and those amendments took effect on July 1, 1994. 37 This legislation, which
has been called "the most significant piece of legislation ever to come out against
the tobacco industry, 38 creates a cause of action through which Florida can sue
tobacco companies directly to recoup money spent on Medicaid to treat tobaccorelated illness and disease. 39 The Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act forms the
cornerstone of Florida's litigation4" and will be the focus of this discussion.
The Florida legislature includes a clear statement of intent at the beginning of
the legislation: "[I]t is the intent of the Legislature that Medicaid be repaid in full
and prior to any other person, program, or entity." ' Further, the law makes clear

Suits Against Tobacco Industry, Product Liability Daily (BNA), July 25, 1994, availablein

LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPLD File [hereinafter MassachusettsLegislation]. In addition to
the state lawsuits, San Francisco recently became the first city to pursue this type of action
against the tobacco companies. Rachel Gordon, S.F. Hauls Tobacco Industry into Court, SAN
FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 7, 1996, at Al. While this action is interesting to show the

magnitude of this legal movement, it is beyond the scope of this Note, which will discuss only
state and federal action.
33. S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
34. See Recent Legislation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 519, 525 (1994).
35. Junda Woo, Mississippi Wants Tobacco Firms to Pay Its Cost of Treating Welfare
Recipients, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1994, at A2.
36. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1996 & Supp. 1996).
37. Tobacco: New Law Permits State to Sue to Recover MedicaidFundsfrom Tobacco

Companies, Product Liability Daily (BNA), June 20, 1994, availablein LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAPLD File [hereinafter Tobacco: New Law].
38. Claudia MacLachan, States May Follow Florida'sNovel Attack"Reimbursement Suits
Can Target Tobacco Companies,NAT'L L.J., May 16, 1994, at B1.
39. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(6)(a).

40. Dexter Douglass, general counsel for Governor Lawton Chiles, filed litigation under
the statute on February 21, 1995. FloridaSues Over Tobacco-RelatedCosts, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.

22, 1995, at D2. Florida is relying heavily on this statute, but also included common law claims
in the litigation. Lucy Morgan, Senate Votes to Repeal Tobacco Suit Law, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5769414.
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1).
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from the outset that the government, irrespective of any claim a Medicaid
recipient might have, would be the first party entitled to receive any damage
awards.4" While this seems to be a very basic idea, this purpose is criticalto the
Florida strategy and shapes many of the substantive and procedural provisions
in the law.
The Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act sets up a structure for a lawsuit that is
very similar to that of a class action.4" This tool allows the government to
aggregate its claims, without the burden of identifying each individual recipient,
and to file one suit against the tobacco companies that are allegedly responsible
for the expense." While this is sure to create massive and very complex
litigation, it is a practical alternative to forcing the government to sue on each
individual claim of Medicaid benefits and it makes sense within the framework
of the legislation.
Section 409.910(9) of the Florida law contains other provisions which build
on this concept. First, the statute allows the issues of causation and damages to
be "proven by use of statistical analysis."4 Because this type of lawsuit is a state
action, the harm here is that suffered by the state. In this case, under the statute,
harm is measured as "the aggregate of harms that a large population of
individuals . . . suffers."46 As such, the use of statistics is fairer and more
accurate than it would be in an action by an individual because statistics are
inherently fairer when used to predict results over a large population.47 Given the
Florida statute's reliance on class action principles, suits filed under the statute
seem tailor-made for the use of statistics, given its focus on the aggregate, not the
individual, harm.
Second, the statute allows the government to proceed under a theory of market
share liability.48 Again, this seems to be necessary to the structure of litigation
under the statute, and fits into the framework presented while furthering the

42. Id. The section says that "[M]edicaid is to be repaid in full... regardless of whether
a recipient is made whole or other creditors paid," and that when the "resources of a liable third
party become available at any time, the public treasury should not bear the burden of medical
assistance." Id. While some principles in the law (such as elimination of key defenses,
discussed below) do apply to an action in which a recipient sues for recovery, the law spells
out the fact that such recovery "shall not act to reduce the recovery of the agency pursuant to
this section." Id Further, under the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, the recipient does not
have the right to become a party to litigation brought by the State. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
409.910(12)(a).
43. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9). The term "class action" is not used in the Florida
statute, but the language used is quite similar to that contained in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. The Florida statute, for example, includes language describing the cause of
action as involving a large number of recipients that would make it "impracticable to join or
identify each claim" and one in which there are "common issues of fact or law."
44. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)(a).
45. Id.
46. Recent Legislation, supra note 34, at 528.
47. Id.
48. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9)(b). The state may proceed under the theory of market
share liability "provided that the products involved are substantially interchangeable among
brands, and that substantially similar factual or legal issues would be involved." Id.
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purpose of focusing on the harm to society and not to the individual. Since such
litigation will not involve looking at the individual and what brand of tobacco
each smoked, this mechanism will allow the State to sue all major brands and
then recover damages based on each company's share of the market. 49 While this
will inevitably be more difficult to accurately apply than it might appear, it is a
system of liability that should work well within the confines of this action.
Third, the statute states that the "concept ofjoint and several liability applies
to any recovery on the part of the agency."5' This, again, reinforces the idea that
the main purpose behind this law is to give the State the best opportunity to
realize recovery if it is victorious in litigation.
Other aspects of the legislation tilt the playing field in favor of Florida even
more explicitly. The most important of these provisions is section 409.910(1)
which, among other things, abrogates "comparative negligence, assumption of
risk, and all other affirmative defenses normally available ... to the extent
necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources."'"
Traditionally, in individual lawsuits by plaintiffs, these common law defenses
have barred recovery. 2 This language makes clear that the legislature intends that
the government be able to pursue suits such as the one contemplated, and that the
State, because of its unique position in relation to the tobacco companies,53
should not be precluded from recovery by the defenses that have historically
hampered individual plaintiffs.
Another provision which has somewhat less clear language declares that
"[c]ommon-law theories of recovery shall be liberally construed to accomplish
[the purpose of this legislation], 54 and that "the evidence code shall be liberally
construed regarding the issues of causation and of aggregate damages."55 While
the exact purpose of these provisions is somewhat cryptic, they create a safety
net for Florida, and could apply to a wide range of decisions a judge could
make.56
Perhaps the least discussed provision of the Florida law is the fraud control
amendment.57 This section of the law states that "[i]n cases of suspected criminal
violations or fraudulent activity.., the department is authorized to take any civil
action permitted at law or equity to recover the greatest possible amount,

49. Recent Legislation, supra note 34, at 529.
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1).
51. Id.
52. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 871. Also, remember that no individual private plaintiff has
won a final judgment or successfully settled a case against tobacco companies in litigation
involving the health risks of tobacco. Id. at 878.
53. The State, unlike its constituent citizens, has never smoked a cigarette, and thus should
not be held to the same standard. See Karen E. Meade, Breaking Through the Tobacco
Industry's Smoke Screen: State Lawsuitsfor Reimbursement ofMedical Expenses, 17 J.LEGAL
MED. 113, 137 (1996) (citation omitted).
54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(9).
56. The reference to the evidence code, in particular, could open the door for courts to
admit the statistical or epidemiological evidence which is necessary to the success of litigation
brought under the statute.
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(19).
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including ... treble damages." 8 While the scope of this provision does not
appear to extend beyond common law remedies, it sends a message that Florida
intends to get tough on those who defraud the publicly funded medical system.
While it is unclear at this point if tobacco will be a target for this provision, that
possibility seems likely in the wake of allegations that tobacco companies have
59
knowingly misled the public for many years regarding a number of issues.
Though Florida has passed legislation which Richard A. Daynard, head of the
Tobacco Products Liability Project, described as "subtle and accurate in its
draftsmanship,"6 ° the State is going beyond the text of the law in its attempt to
succeed in litigation. In pursuing litigation, the State has attempted to match the
talent hired by the tobacco companies. From the earliest cases in which the
tobacco companies were sued for tort damages, they have always retained the
"most prestigious law firms in the country" to pursue their defense. 6'
Traditionally, but with some exceptions, the plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases
62
have been personal injury attorneys practicing alone or in very small firms. In
contrast, in the current case, Florida has "an army of private-product liability
attorneys ready to handle the case."63 They have accomplished this by
implementing a contingency plan which calls for twenty-five percent of any final
judgment to go to those attorneys.64 While this agreement could deplete any
possible judgment, it does help assure that legal talent is available. Additionally,
this plan could also save Florida money-if this risky litigation is not
successful-by saving the state a major portion of the investment needed to
pursue the action.
The Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act is a dramatic and controversial piece
of legislation which was quickly challenged by the tobacco companies. In one of
the first volleys in the litigation, Philip Morris, Inc. and Associated Industries of
Florida ("AIF"), a business group, challenged the constitutionality of the law,
claiming that it "is an unconstitutional intrusion by the legislature into the
powers of the judicial branch and completely disregards existing Florida rules of
procedure and practice, and the constitutional guarantees for the separation of
power [sic]." 65 In response, Florida argued that the state agency "still bears the
burden of proving threshold liability issues and establishing the aggregate

58. Id.
59. See ELIZABETH M. WHELAN, A SMOKING GUN: How THE TOBACCO INDusTRY GETs
AWAY WITH MuRDER 93 (1984); Christopher J. Farley, Cough Up That Cash, TIME, Mar. 6,
1995, at 47.
60. See MacLachlan, supra note 38. Fredric G. Levin, a plaintiffs attorney from Pensacola,
drafted the legislation. Id.
61. Rabin, supra note 2, at 859 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 858. The most notable exception came in the second wave of tobacco litigation
in which plaintiffs' attorneys who had experience in toxic tort (generally asbestos) cases joined
ranks and resources against the tobacco companies. Id. at 866, 869.
63. FloridaSues Over Tobacco-Related Costs, supra note 40.
64. Id.
65. Tobacco: Philip Morris Challenges New Florida Law Authorizing State to Sue for
Reimbursement, Product Liability Daily (BNA) (July 15, 1994), availablein LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNAPLD File [hereinafter Philip Morris Challenges New FloridaLaw] (quoting
plaintiffs' joint statement).
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harm"66 and that any third party can deny liability or deny that the products
involved are "substantially interchangeable among brands."'6
The first ruling concerning the constitutionality of the statuteproduced mixed
results.6 The Florida trial judge upheld the constitutionality of the law
concerning market share liability, abrogation.of defenses, and use of statistics. 9
This ruling was a victory for the State, the defendant, in the litigation. However,
the plaintiffs did not lose every issue, as the trial judge also ruled that Florida
could only seek damages for tobacco-related Medicaid costs incurred after the
July 1, 1994 effective date of the law. ° This limited the amount of damages that
the State could recover to much less than the requested $1.4 billion. Second, the
trial judge ruled that the agency which the law designates to bring this lawsuit,
and which also licenses "every hospital, physician, nurse, nursing home,... and
every Medicaid provider," is unconstitutionally structured.'
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court cleared up some of these issues further.
Florida's highest court recently ruled that Florida's statute was "neither arbitrary
nor capricious. It [was] a rational response to a public need."7 2 First, the court,
speaking through Justice Ben Overton, reversed the trial court in ruling that the
agency designated to bring this suit under the statute is organized
constitutionally. 3 This should resolve any problems that Florida may have had
concerning standing to sue. Second, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
arguments by the tobacco companies that limiting their access to affirmative
defenses made the Florida law unconstitutional.74 Third, the court ruled that the
law's provision allowing the use of statistical evidence was a valid exercise of
the legislature's power.75
While these rulings were a partial victory for the State, the other parts of the
decision were not as favorable. Most notably, the court ruled that Florida must
identify each individual recipient of Medicaid for which reimbursement is
sought.7 6 Only through this process, said the court, can "a defendant .. .

66. Tobacco: FloridaDefends ConstitutionalityofLaw AuthorizingSuits Against Cigarette
Firms, Product Liability Daily (BNA) (Aug. 5, 1994), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAPLD File [hereinafter FloridaDefends Constitutionality].
67. Id.(quoting defendants' answer to complaint).
68. Constitutionalityof Law Allowing Floridato Sue Tobacco Firms Upheld, 4 Health L.
Rep. (BNA) 25 (June 22, 1995), availablein WL at 4 BHLR 25 [hereinafter Constitutionality
Upheld]; Florida v. American Tobacco Co. (Florida Palm Beach County Circuit Court) (#CL95-1466A0); Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., No. 94-3128
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon County ruling issued June 16, 1995).
69. ConstitutionalityUpheld, supra note 68, at 25.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Cahoy, supra note 30 (quoting Justice Overton in Agency for Health Care Admin. v.
Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So.2d 1239, 1257 (Fla. 1996)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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challenge improper payments made to individual recipients." ' Although the
scope of information that the State must supply about each recipient is unclear
at this point, this could significantly broaden and complicate the discovery
process involved for this type of action, and prove a major roadblock to recovery.
The court also upheld the trial court in ruling that the State can only seek
reimbursement for payments made after the statute's effective date of July 1,
1994.78 Finally, the court ruled that the State can pursue the tobacco companies
under a market share liability theory or under joint and several liability, but can
not use both simultaneously. 9
The Florida Supreme Court ruling clears up many of the state law issues, but
the tobacco companies are very likely to appeal their claims to the United States
Supreme Court. Others have also discussed constitutional issues surrounding the
law in question. Professor Laurence Tribe, who is working for Florida on this
case, has commented that "Florida's law is constitutionally sound, intelligent,
eminently fair and consistent with federal law."8" Scott Richardson, the author
of a comment on a related topic, has also discussed the constitutional issues
surrounding the Florida law." While his analysis of the procedural due process
challenge by the tobacco companies does not come to a firm conclusion, he notes
that cases from the United States Supreme Court have discussed the issue of
eliminating defenses and concluded that a "state legislature could alter, or even
set aside the common-law rules of negligence, assumption of risk, [or]
contributory negligence."82 Further, the Supreme Court has generally allowed
state legislatures a wide measure of discretion in such matters unless they act in
an "arbitrary and unreasonable" manner. 3
The constitutional issues surrounding this law are unique and present problems
and possibilities that have not been debated before. While initial decisions
indicate that courts will approve of this type of statute, there will be many rulings
before an answer is reached. In an effort to reach some middle ground, the trial
court in Florida has ordered that mediation talks take place between the parties
to the lawsuit. 4 If these talks fail (every indication is that they have not yet been
very successful)85 then trial for the matter will be set for August, 1997.6

77. Id. (quoting Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678
So.2d 1239, 1254 (Fla. 1996)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. FloridaDefends Constitutionality,supra note 66.
81. Scott Richardson, Comment, Attorney General'sWarning: LegislationMay Now Be
Hazardousto Tobacco Companies'Health,28 AKRON L. REV. 291, 321-24 (1995).
82. Id. at 323 (discussing New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917)).
83. Id at 323-24 (discussing Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400, 419 (1919)).
84. Big Tobacco, State Begin Talks on Suit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 25, 1996, at Cl,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, ORSENT File.
85. See id.
86. Robin Fields, Two Sides Gain Little Groundin State Tobacco Suit, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), July 25, 1996, at B4, availablein LEXIS, News Library, SUNSEN File.
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B. Mississippi'sApproach
While Florida has aggressively pursued a statute-based action against tobacco
companies for reimbursement of Medicaid expenses, the Mississippi attorney
general, Mike Moore, has just as actively pursued an action based on common
law theories of recovery. On May 23, 1994, Mississippi became the first state to
sue the tobacco companies in this type of action by filing suit in state court in
Jackson County.8 7 In a surprising development, the Mississippi action, under
Moore's strong leadership, recently made headlines by helping produce the firstever settlement by a tobacco company in a health-related lawsuit 8 The Liggett
Group, which settled with Mississippi and four other states, 89 is the smallest of
the major tobacco firms and controls only about two percent of the U.S. market
for tobacco,9" so the Mississippi lawsuit will continue against the bulk of the
defendants.
In an interesting strategic move, Mississippi filed suit in the Chancery Court,
a court of equity.9 While the tobacco companies initially achieved removal of the
action to federal court, the state was successful in having the case remanded to
the state courts.92 Even though the Mississippi Court of Equity generally does not
handle such large cases, concentrating on family law and divorce actions, Moore
thinks that the equity court is the right forum for this new type of lawsuit.93
According to Trey Bobbinger, an assistant attorney general, the State of
Mississippi has "pled state law claims" with its primary theory being "unjust

87. See Sarah C. Campbell, MississippiSues Tobacco Firmsfor Recovery of Medical Care
Costs, THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), May 24, 1994, ht Al, available in 1994 WL

6066857.
88. See Mathews, supra note 3.
89. See id.

90. Inside Health Care Reform: States Rush to File Medicaid Tobacco Suits, 4 WASH.
June 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8886696.

HEALTH WK.,

91. Tobacco: Mississippi Seeking Remand ofLawsuit Demanding Health Care Monies

from Industry, Product Liability Daily (BNA) (July 27, 1994) available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNAPLD File [hereinafter MississippiSeeking Remand].
92. See id.; see also Milo Geyelin, Tobacco CompaniesAre Set Back by Actions in Florida,
Mississippi, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1995, at B 1.

93. Woo, supra note 35.
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enrichment, an equitable theory."94 Moore explains that "[tihe lawsuit is
premised on a simple notion: you cause the health crisis, you pay for it." 95
The Mississippi suit is very similar to the Florida suit in a number of ways.
First, and most significantly, the State is attempting in this single action to
recover expenses for tobacco-related illness and disease for all recipients of
assistance, as opposed to suing individually on each claim. 96 Mississippi also
intends to use statistical analysis in97a manner similar to that used in Florida to
prove the crucial issues in the case.
Like Florida, Mississippi has developed a plan which will encourage lawyers
from the private sector to lend their expertise. Unlike Florida, which promised
a percentage of any recovery to private lawyers, Mississippi has not implemented
a contingency fee plan. Instead, the Mississippi Attorney General "plans to try
to compel the tobacco companies to pay the private lawyers' fees" in the event
of a victory.98 Notwithstanding that victory is far from certain, it appears that this
strategy has been successful in tempting at least some talented private sector
lawyers into the fray on the side of the State.99
Because this lawsuit has had more time to develop than some of the other
similar lawsuits, several defendants, including R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
have filed answers that indicate the type of defenses they will mount.'00 One
defense mentioned by R.J. Reynolds is that Mississippi's claims are "barred
because the state permits, regulates, facilitates, and reaps revenues from cigarette
sales."' This defense appears to be the classic assumption of risk defense, recast
to apply to the state instead of to the individual smoker. R.J. Reynolds also
defends on the ground that any damages won should be offset by tax money paid
to the state as a result of the sale or use of tobacco. 2 In an early ruling,
Mississippi apparently won at least a partial victory in the battle over which
defenses the tobacco companies may assert. On February 21, 1995, the

94. MississippiSeeking Remand,supranote 91. Mississippi is also seeking recovery under
the theory of public nuisance and claims that the tobacco companies have attempted to
"mislead and confuse the public about the true dangers associated with smoking." Woo, supra
note 35. In support of its claim that tobacco companies have been dishonest Mississippi
recently subpoenaed Jeffrey Wigand, a former tobacco industry executive. Before Wigand
could testify, however, a Kentucky judge ruled that a confidentiality agreement with his
employer barred his testimony. See Tobacco Source Silenced, CI. SUN-THIMs, Nov. 26, 1995,
at 51. Since then, Wigand has given deposition testimony in the Kentucky case and in a suit
by Brown & Williamson against him claiming breach of confidentiality, theft, and fraud. See
Wigand DepositionsBegins in Tobacco Case, West's Legal News, July 17, 1996, availablein
1996 WL 397598.
95. Campbell, supranote 87.
96. See Woo, supra note 35.
97. See id.
98.Id.
99. See Campbell, supranote 87.
100. See MississippiSeeking Remand, supra note 91.
101. Id.
102. Id. The article quotes the assistant to the chairman of the Mississippi Tax Commission
as claiming that the state collects $90 million annually in "tobacco-related revenues." See infra
part III of this Note for further discussion of this issue.
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Chancellor of the Chancery Court in Jackson County issued an "order that struck
'the affirmative defenses of the defendants.""' 3 While this decision was only that
of a trial court, and will surely be appealed to the highest levels, it is an
indication that the court does not disfavor this type of lawsuit.
C. Other States
Florida and Mississippi have been the most aggressive states so far in the
reimbursement suits that are starting to spring up around the country, but other
states are following the trend. While some of them are using suits similar to the
ones already discussed,0 4 others are pursuing different theories and strategies.
Perhaps the most interesting and important of these suits is found in
Minnesota. The State of Minnesota, along with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Minnesota, 05 filed suit in August, 1994, seeking recovery under theories of
antitrust conspiracy and consumer fraud." 6 Minnesota has followed in
Mississippi's footsteps by engaging the assistance of private attorneys and asking
the courts to order that the tobacco companies pay the State's costs in the event
of a victory.0 7
Minnesota's suit is interesting because of the theories the state is forwarding.
In the words of Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey III, "[p]revious
lawsuits have said the tobacco companies should pay because their products are
dangerous.... This suit says they should pay because their conduct is illegal."'0 8
The tobacco companies dismiss this suit as nothing new, and predict that their
unblemished litigation record will stand.0 9
The focus of the proof in this litigation appears to be quite different from that
in other states. The plaintiffs intend to center their case around the December,
1953, meeting of tobacco executives in New York City."0 Advertisements
claiming that smoking tobacco was safe, which conflicted with two studies which
had just been released, appeared in Minnesota and all over the United States
following that meeting."' The lawsuit claims both that this advertising misled the

103. Geyelin, supranote 92.
104. On July 10, Massachusetts Governor William Weld signed legislation similar to, but
more limited than, that in Florida which could support similar litigation. Massachusetts
Legislation, supranote 32.
105. In an early ruling, a court has decided that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota
can proceed as a party in the lawsuit, despite the objections of tobacco company lawyers. See
Ed Gaulin, Tobacco Companies Dealt More Setbacks: Minnesota Ruling Lets Insurer File
Lawsuit, THE ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 26, 1996, at A3, availablein LEXIS, News Library,
ATLJNL File.
106. Gordon Slovut, State, Blue Cross Sue Tobacco Industry, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis/St.
Paul), Aug. 18, 1994, at Al, availablein LEXIS, News Library, BUSDTL File.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. See id.
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public and that the major tobacco companies should now be held liable as a result
of their illegal conduct."'
In an early ruling, the United States Supreme Court, without comment, recently
upheld a lower court ruling which provided Minnesota with access to a database
indexing the tobacco companies' internal documents."' In the State's battle to
sift through over nine million documents,"' this ruling could prove crucial.
Additionally, this ruling is the first of its kind and could provide precedent to
allow the release of this type of database in other pending cases." 5
West Virginia also entered the fray and sued the large tobacco companies last
year on a variety of common law theories including nuisance, unjust enrichment,
and fraud." 6 This lawsuit has probably been the least successful of any of the
suits discussed so far. In May, 1995, the trial judge in the case dismissed eight
of the ten claims brought by the State because, under West Virginia law, the
Attorney General is only authorized to sue under statutes unless the Governor
gives authorization to sue under the common law." 7 Additionally, West Virginia
had decided to pursue the lawsuit with the help of private attorneys working
under a contingency fee plan. In October, 1995, however, the trial judge ruled
that the State could not pursue this litigation through a contingency fee plan, but
could continue with the help of private attorneys working under fee
arrangements." 8 This lawsuit demonstrates that state law is powerful in
controlling many of these lawsuits and may provide a barrier to recovery for
some states.
One state that is attempting to avoid this barrier is Texas, which recently filed
a lawsuit in federal court in Texarkana."' While this action is still in its
formative stages, it alleges several grounds for recovery, including antitrust,
racketeering, mail and wire fraud, products liability, and restitution. 120 The
lawsuit seeks $4 billion in damages, the largest figure among the pending

112. Id.
113. David Phelps, High Court Ruling Backs Access to Data in State Tobacco Suit, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), May 29, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BUSDTL File.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Tobacco: Attempts to Hold Tobacco FirmsLiablefor Costs Lose Ground in Florida,
West Virginia, Product Liability Daily (BNA) (May 5, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNAPLD File [hereinafter Attempts Lose Ground].
117. Tobacco: West Virginia Court Says State Cannot Sue Tobacco Companies on
ContingencyFee Basis,Product Liability Daily (BNA) (Nov. 21, 1995), availablein LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNAPLD File. The antitrust and consumer protection claims were allowed to
go forward.
118. See id.
119. Kathy Walt, Texas Sues Tobacco Industry, Hous. CHRON., March 29, 1996, at Al,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, HCHRON File.
120. Id.; see also John Gonzalez, State Sues Tobacco Industry: Texas Seeks Recovery of
MedicaidExpenses, THE FORT-WORTH

1996 WL 5529968.

STAR-TELEGRAM,

March 29, 1996, at 1, available in
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lawsuits, and adds makers of smokeless and "roll-your-own" tobacco as
additional defendants.12'
If this lawsuit is successful, the judgment proceeds would be split among
parties in a unique fashion: Texas would keep thirty-three percent, 2 the federal
government would receive fifty-two percent, and private lawyers enlisted to try
the case would receive the remaining fifteen percent.'23 While other states have
fought to keep money with the state and out of the hands of the federal
government, 24 Texas has apparently recognized that much of the money used to
treat smoking-related illness and disease is federal money and has apportioned
any potential recovery to acknowledge this fact.
D. FederalGovernment
While the federal sponsors of legislation, Senators Harkin and Lautenberg,
modeled their proposed law after Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act,
they have not had Florida's success.' 25 Even though the federal bill did not
become law, it could always be reintroduced in Congress. Further, examining the
similarities and differences between the two laws helps explain the issue of
reimbursement and how best to address it.
The similarities of the Florida law and the federal bill are numerous. They both
call for a similar class-action type of lawsuit and allow the use of aggregate
measures in the action. 6 Additionally, both plans allow the use of market-share
liability in apportioning liability. 7
The differences in the two pieces of legislation, however, are more interesting
and enlightening. The first difference, and the most significant, is that the federal
bill did not limit recovery to Medicaid, but extended recovery to include
Medicare, the veterans' health care program, and "any other similar Federal
health care program."'2 Given the amount of money that the federal government
spends on Medicare,' 29 this is a natural and logical extension of the Florida
legislation.
The second difference is that the federal bill did not contain a clause which
eliminated the common law defenses such as assumption of risk. While the
necessity of such a provision is in question (as described above, the defenses
were struck at the early stages of the Mississippi litigation) the provision is one

121. Gonzalez, supranote 120.
122. This money would go to Texas's general fund. Id.
123. Stuart Eskenazi, Texas Files $4 Billion Tobacco Lawsuit, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
March 29, 1996, at Al, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Austin File. The lawyers for Texas
include several attorneys from Texas and Harvard professors Laurence Tribe and Arthur Miller.
Gonzalez, supra note 120.
124. See Tobacco Lawsuit Settlement Issue Gets Cleared Up, THE COM. APPEAL, Aug. 2,
1996, at Al8.
125. S.2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
126. See supratext accompanying notes 43-44.
127. Id.
128. S.2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(3) (1994).
129. S.2245. As previously noted, the bill estimated the federal expenditure on Medicare
to be over five times that on Medicaid. Id.
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of the most important in the Florida legislation and clearly indicates the
legislature's purpose.
Third, in a minor addition, the federal bill would have allowed for the use of
statistical and epidemiological evidence. 3 While one author has argued that
Florida's admission of statistical evidence could possibly extend to
epidemiological evidence by analogy,'3 ' a clear statement through the law is the
best way to ensure admissibility of such evidence.
Fourth, the federal law would have allowed the government to proceed under
alternative theories of "concerted action or enterprise liability, or both, if
warranted by the facts presented to the court."'13 With evidence mounting that
tobacco companies acted together to mislead the public about the dangers of
smoking, these alternative theories could have proved valuable and significant.
Next, Part III will compare and contrast the strategies pursued by the various
government plaintiffs in these lawsuits, to illuminate the similarities and
differences in the strategies pursued, and to comment on the strengths and
weaknesses of the various strategies.
III. POLICY OR POLITICS-WHICH WILL MAKE THE
DIFFERENCE?

As this Note has set forth, there are several reimbursement actions in progress,
about to happen, or in the planning stages. In this age when budget shortfalls are
the norm instead of the exception, policy and politics dictate that the government
garner funds from all available sources. While it may make good policy to seek
reimbursement for tobacco-related public medical expenditures, politics plays
perhaps even a greater role than policy in the debate surrounding these suits. This
Part highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches, sets forth
some policy arguments for and against this type of action, and introduces the
political issues surrounding the debate.
Florida's litigation, based on the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act,'33 is the
most prominent reimbursement lawsuit in the country. 4 The greatest strength of
the Florida action is its overall structure, which follows from its central purpose
of achieving reimbursement.'35 Specific provisions that call for the use of market
share liability or joint and several liability and statistical evidence complete the
picture of a law which is efficient and potentially damaging to the tobacco
company defendants. While the law is very well-drafted and thoughtful, there are
areas of weakness and uncertainty that are worth exploring. First, a critic has
complained that the law "is too broad because, although it is tailored for
application to cigarettes, its terms sweep to include in their ambit all products

130. S. 2245, § 3(c).
131. See Richardson, supra note 81, at 329.
132. S. 2245, § 3(d).
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
134. Mississippi has won the first settlement award from Liggett, a huge victory, but
Florida's lawsuit is still much larger in terms of potential liability and has garnered more
publicity.

135. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910.
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liability.' 36 That critic has also complained that the law "is too narrow because
it does not extend to reimbursement for Medicare expenditures.' 37
The first criticism requires a two-part analysis. The first should ask why it is
that the law, which does not mention tobacco explicitly, is defective simply
because it could potentially be used against other products. After all, alcohol
almost certainly causes health problems, and even less virulent products such as
red meat and processed sugar probably cost Florida and other states precious
public funds for additional health care. Another response to this argument is that
the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act does not guarantee recovery-the state
still must prove liability, including causation. In the case of the vast majority of
non-tobacco products on the market,' 38 however, courts have not recognized
inherent danger in their use.' 39 Although juries have recognized the dangers of
tobacco and have often had little problem finding causation, plaintiffs have
nevertheless been denied recovery for a variety of reasons, including the tobacco
companies' successful use of affirmative defenses. 4 0 These differences between
tobacco and non-tobacco products would almost certainly derail any action that
a state official might decide to bring under a Florida-type law against a product
other than tobacco.
Even assuming that others could bring such an action, the general political
climate is another huge limiting factor. While Florida business groups' 4' have
come out against the law, there has been no indication that an official would
really sue anyone but cigarette manufacturers under this law. To make this crystal
clear, in March, 1995, Governor Chiles of Florida issued Executive Order 95-109
that directed Florida agencies to apply the law only against tobacco companies.' 42
The federal bill, by its terms, applied only to tobacco.'43 While this cannot
guarantee that a Florida-type law will not be used against other products, there
has been no indication that anyone in any level of government in any state
intends to extend the reach of such a law. In the final analysis, the very thought
that an attorney general would bring a "red meat products liability action" seems
rather absurd in today's political climate.
The second criticism leveled against the Florida law-its underbreadth-is
salient and worth exploring in more detail. While it is true that the Florida law

136. Recent Legislation, supra note 34, at 529.
137. Id.
138. The most often-mentioned product, alcohol, presents very interesting issues, but is
beyond the scope of this Note.
139. Senator Harkin notes in his support of the federal legislation that tobacco, unlike beef,
sugar, and other products, is the "only product on the market today that when used as intended
causes death, disease, and disability," 140 CONG. REc. S2245, 7784, 7786 (daily ed. June 28,
1994). This distinguishes tobacco from all other products including alcohol, which, recent
studies show, has health benefits when used responsibly.
140. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 860-70.
141. AIF, a party to the countersuit against Florida, is the most prominent example of this
type of group. See supratext accompanying note 65.
142. Tobacco: FloridaLawmakers May Repeal Law Allowing Recovery of Fundsfrom
Tobacco Firms, Product Liability Daily (BNA) (Apr. 7, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA

Library, BNAPLD File.
143. S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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does not include provisions for reimbursement of Medicaid expenditures, the
federal bill was considerably more broad, asking for reimbursement for
Medicaid, Medicare, and other similar government programs.'" This comes close
to curing the underbreadth problem, but still falls short of full reimbursement of
the costs of tobacco to our public health system. For example, one recent
proposal puts forth the idea that public hospitals should be able to bring lawsuits
against tobacco (and alcohol) manufacturers for un-reimbursed expenditures for
treatment of illness and disease which these products cause. 45 This illustrates
that, even if litigation under a Florida-type law (or even the broader federal
proposal) were successful, liability would probably not reach a level that would
bring full reimbursement for all health expenditures that tobacco has made
necessary. A possible alternative would be to include these additional
expenditures, such as public hospital expenses not covered by Medicaid, in the
same litigation in which the state sues for Medicaid reimbursement. The state
could then share the amount it recovers with the public hospitals in the state.
There are other ways to address the problem of underinclusiveness. One
method would be to ask for other types of damages. One such category of
damages, which has not been addressed adequately, 46 is money spent to treat
people who are sick as a result of exposure to ETS. According to available
statistics, thousands die each year as a result of exposure to ETS and many more
become sick. 47 While exact figures of health care expenses are not available as
to the economic cost of this problem to the public, the sums involved are
obviously huge. While such damages would be more speculative than damages
from direct exposure to tobacco smoke, new and more persuasive scientific
evidence is coming out every day which establishes the link between exposure
to ETS and illness and disease.148 At some point the evidence will be persuasive
enough that, under the statistical approach to liability found in the Florida law,
causation issues may be surmountable and reimbursement will be possible.
Apart from these concerns, a second major issue that must be addressed in
examining a state reimbursement law like the Florida Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act is the political battle surrounding such a statute. The Florida law
was passed in the spring of 1994 with little fanfare even though it is highly
controversial today. 1 49 There was little commotion over this bill because
Governor Chiles arranged to have a friend in the legislature attach it to the end
of a "noncontroversial Medicaid bill during the [Florida legislative] session's

144. See id.
145. Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitalsto Recover Expendituresfor
the Treatment ofDisease,Injury and DisabilityCausedby Tobacco andAlcohol, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 81, 84 (1994).
146. See Medical-CareExpenditures, supra note 12, at 472.
147. See supranote 20.
148. E.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKrNG:

A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 7

(1986).
149. See Linda Kleindienst & John Kennedy, Law DeclaresMedicaid War on Tobacco,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 27, 1994, at CI, available in LEXIS, News Library, ORSENT File.
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waning hours." 5 ' Shortly after its passage, however, tobacco lobbyists read the
bill, realized its implications, and with a "howl of outrage," went to work arguing
for its repeal.'' The tobacco lobby has been quite successful in this endeavor,
and both houses of the Florida legislature have voted to repeal the law.' 52 Only
the determined efforts and the veto power of Governor Chiles have kept the law
on the books.'53
The initial "success" of the Florida law dwarfs that of its cousin, proposed
(federal) Senate Bill 2245, which was introduced in 1994. That bill had no
success, as evidenced by its total lack of a record after introduction.'54 The
history of these two pieces of legislation, the first two of their kind, shows that
passing a law like the Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act may be
impossible without "smoke and mirrors.".
So, what is the lesson from this? In April, 1994, the Florida legislature passed
the Medicaid reimbursement statute and the battle looked like it would move
from the Florida capitol building to the State's courtrooms. With the future of the
law uncertain, but looking promising following the Florida Supreme Court
ruling, the battle once again is being fought on two fronts-the courts and the
political arena. While public sentiment seems to be largely in favor of making
tobacco companies pay their own way in society,'55 the lobbying5power
of the
6
tobacco industry is unmatched and obviously still very effective.'
This means that if lawsuits go forward, a state with a reimbursement statute
should still forcefully argue its case based on federal law and common law
theories of recovery. Such an approach would provide a safety net in case its
statutory authorization to sue disappears or proves less powerful than
anticipated.5 7 It goes without saying that states without a statute similar to the
one in Florida must rely on federal law and common law as their primary
weapons as they pursue reimbursement.

150. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 27.
151. Morgan, supranote 40.
152. According to a newspaper, one of those who voted for the repeal was Senator Childers,
ore of the principal "architects" of the law when it passed in 1994. Id.
153. The Governor vetoed S.B. 42 (the repeal measure) which had been approved in the
Florida House of Representatives and in the Florida Senate. Morgan, supra note 40. Though
the tobacco companies were "optimistic" that the legislature would override the veto, so far the
law is still on the books. In Texas, although there is no statute analogous to the one in Florida,
a similar political battle has begun over pending litigation. See Bruce Nichols, Texas Suit Sends
Signal to Tobacco Firms, THE DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 30, 1996, at 1H, availablein
LEXIS, News Library, DANEWS File.
154. S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). There is no record of this bill being referred to
a committee or having any kind of vote.
155. Attempts Lose Ground,supra note 116. In speaking with reporters, Governor Chiles
cited an independent public opinion poll in which 63% of the public stated that they think
tobacco companies should pay for part of the health care costs they are responsible for creating.
156. Thomas, supra note 27.
157. After all, reimbursement litigation under a statute is an unproven action. Until the
constitutional challenges to the statute are handled by a high court, it is really unknown (and
unknowable) what impact the statute will have on the litigation.
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Texas is the first example of a state that has decided to pursue reimbursement
through the federal courts. The Attorney General and his legal team have done
this for a couple of strategic reasons that may serve as a model to other states if
they are successful. The first reason that they filed in federal court was to avoid
the overburdened state trial courts and attempt to move quickly toward trial.'58
Dan Morales, the Attorney General, has stated that he hopes to go to trial within
eighteen months," 9 which would in itself set a precedent for this type of
litigation."6 The second reason that the Texas team has pursued reimbursement
in federal court is that it wants to avoid the elected and partisan state judges of
Texas and deal with the more independent federal judiciary.' 6' While the success
of the federal court action in Texas is very much in doubt, these strategies are
interesting and could apply to many states which want to pursue reimbursement.
The Mississippi lawsuit best exemplifies a successful state approach using the
force of existing state common law. By filing in a court of equity in Mississippi,
the State was able to shift the focus from procedure-the favorite focus of the
tobacco attorneys-to substantive fairness. The State implemented a litigation
strategy similar to several provisions in the Florida statute, including a class
action structure and use of statistical evidence.' 62 What makes this unsurprising
and completely rational is that, without these provisions, this breed of lawsuit
could not succeed. Though states may be willing to work hard and invest money
to prosecute these suits, to do so on a recipient-by-recipient basis would be
financial suicide and is not really an option.
The Mississippi lawsuit relies in large measure on equitable theories of
recovery. As such, one of the issues which has come to the forefront there and
also exists in every state pursuing this type of action, is whether any recovery by
the State should be offset by tax dollars collected by the State from excise taxes
and other taxes aimed at tobacco products. 63 The tobacco companies, of course,
argue that any recovery should be offset by the revenues collected by the states.
In response, states argue that these lawsuits are completely unique and that tax
revenues are irrelevant. As a legal issue, this has yet to be dealt with, but policy
concerns mandate that any recovery not be offset by taxes that have already been
collected. One reason for non-recovery is that the policy goal behind these suits
is full reimbursement for health care costs caused by smoking-any offset would
result in a recovery that would not be full reimbursement. Second, the bulk of
revenues collected by the states comes from excise or sales taxes collected by the
government from sales to smokers.' 6 These lawsuits are different. Instead of
collecting money from smokers, these lawsuits attempt to hold the manufacturers
themselves liable for the damage they have caused to society. While this cost may
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ultimately be passed on to consumers,"" it is an important difference that
justifies recovery without an offset for tax revenue.
Overall, the success of this wave of lawsuits may ultimately rest on two key
litigation strategies. First, the plaintiff states will need to achieve abrogation of
defendants' affirmative defenses which were asked for by plaintiffs in Florida
and Mississippi. 66
' Mississippi achieved early success in its efforts to have the
affirmative defenses of the tobacco companies struck (without the help of a
statutory authorization); Florida has achieved a similar favorable ruling, 7 but
with the added help of statutory authorization. Courts have thus far been willing
to strike affirmative defenses in these types of actions because the affirmative
defenses traditionally used by the tobacco companies, especially assumption of
risk, are not appropriate in an action brought by a state. While an individual
smoker may be viewed as having assumed a known risk,'68 the same argument has
far less power when applied to a state.'69 Although tobacco is legal in America,
the state has not assumed the financial risks associated with tobacco-related
illness and disease any more than it has assumed the financial risks associated
with welfare fraud. The assumption of risk defense traditionally balances the
scales by disallowing recovery by a party that has, itself, behaved in a non-risk
averse manner. Here, the state has not acted in a risky manner at all, but has just
acted to provide health care to its indigent and aged population, and should not
be barred from recovery by the assumption of risk defense.
The second litigation strategy that seems to distinguish these actions from past
ones, and should help the states obtain reimbursement, is that all the states have
a system set up which encourages private attorneys to lend their expertise to the
state. 7 As noted above in Part II, tobacco companies have traditionally
outnumbered and overwhelmed plaintiffs in lawsuits asking for health-related
damages. The current group of litigants recognized that fact and have worked to
combat it by providing incentives for investment by private lawyers and law
firms. While a contingent fee system is acceptable and has apparently worked
well to attract legal talent to Florida's and Texas's lawsuits, Mississippi's and
Minnesota's approaches have also attracted legal talent. These approaches are
better because they would not deplete any eventual recovery as Florida's and
Texas's approaches would. If, however, attorneys' fees are denied in
Minnesota's and Mississippi's suits under the American rule, Florida's and
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Texas's contingent fee systems could be better. The point here is not particularly
that one system or the other is more desirable, but that one type of these systems
is necessary if these lawsuits are to achieve success. Only with the help of a team
of highly-talented lawyers did private plaintiffs begin to see even marginal
success against tobacco companies,171 and likewise, states will need this
advantage as well as the advantages of their unique positions as government
entities if they are to win recovery against a tobacco company.
CONCLUSION

Reimbursement lawsuits have been characterized and mischaracterized in many
ways. Some people call them gimmicks, while others call them a tax on
consumers. They are neither. Instead, they are a new breed of lawsuit designed
to make tobacco companies pay expenses they are responsible for creating. In
this respect, such actions are not punitive, but only attempt to shift costs from
society to those companies that profit from the sale of tobacco. These lawsuits
not only do that, but attempt to shift costs in the most equitable and efficient
manner available by allocating liability on a theory of market share liability. 72
This should result in neither overdeterrence nor underdeterrence, but should
instead shift just the right amount of costs to the industry to allow the companies
to make tough decisions about the true costs of tobacco.
Recently, a popular magazine noted that the Chrysler Corporation, which
previously included a cigarette lighter and ashtray as standard equipment on its
7
vehicles, now charges a premium for those items on its popular minivan. ' What
was once a subsidy to the smoker and a burden to the non-smoker is now an
option that is paid for like any other piece of special equipment. While the
analogy is not perfect, it does seem obvious that today, in our changing world,
the government should ask no less of the smoker than the car manufacturer does
and should be reimbursed for health care expenses that it incurs because of this
deadly habit. This type of litigation does not seek a curtailment of smokers'
rights. The federal and various state governments merely seek for tobacco
companies and smokers to face up to their responsibilities-in this age of
constant budget and medical care crises, no less is acceptable.
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